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Radically usage-based diachronic construction grammar and the development of 
non-deontic be bound to. 
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Even when both use and cognition are incorporated in its theorizing about 
grammatical change, research in the budding discipline of diachronic 
construction grammar which explicitly subscribes to a “usage-based” approach 
does not always distinguish between abstraction from the observed usage of a 
linguistic community and individual linguistic knowledge. Given that language 
change starts with innovations by individuals and that experientially constructed 
knowledge is necessarily diverse, such a distinction crucially needs to be made 
to arrive at a realistic usage-based account of grammatical change. This paper 
first assesses the extent to which the conflicting models of Elizabeth Traugott 
and Olga Fischer succeed in teasing apart internal and external systems, 
concluding that while the former’s reanalysis model results from an external 
semasiological perspective, the latter’s analogy model is more radically usage-
based in that it does not inherently entangle intra- and extra-individual 
knowledge. By way of an illustration of a radically usage-based approach, the 
second part of the paper proposes an onomasiological account of how the pattern 
be bound to came to be used as a non-deontic/epistemic necessity marker, 
offering an alternative to viewing it as a development from the historically prior 
deontic be bound to construction. 
 
Keywords: diachronic construction grammar; usage-based model; construction-
alization; analogy; periphrastic modals; be bound to. 
 
1. Less and more usage-based diachronic construction grammar 
 
“Diachronic Construction Grammar” has been parsimoniously defined — in the 
introductory chapter to Barðdal et al. (2015), the edited volume so entitled — as “the 
historical study of constructions” (Barðdal & Gildea 2015: 42) and, somewhat more 
generously, as a field of work in linguistics that addresses linguistic change from the 
perspective of construction grammar (slightly adapted from Traugott & Trousdale 2013: 
39). In other words, it can be taken to be a field of linguistics which looks at how 
constructions come into being as form-meaning pairings and how these form-meaning 
pairings might subsequently change, or more broadly at the evolution of the 
constructional resources of a language, i.e. of “constructicons”.1 
                                                 
* Correspondence to: School of English, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong. 
Tel. 852 39172755. 
E-mail address: dnoel@hku.hk. 
1 There is no agreement on whether the three words of the field name should be capitalized or not, with 
all three possibly meaningful variants occurring: “Diachronic Construction Grammar” (cf. Barðdal 2011; 
Barðdal & Gildea 2015; Hilpert 2015), with maximal capitalization, “diachronic Construction Grammar” 
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An important strand of work within diachronic construction grammar comprises 
research one could bring together under the heading of “constructionist 
grammaticalization theory”, which can be distinguished from “historical construction 
grammar” (Noël 2013, 2016). While the latter builds on synchronic construction 
grammatical work, the grammaticalization strand encompasses work in the 
grammaticalization theoretical tradition subsequent to the constructionist turn it 
witnessed around the start of the century. Two of its leading influencers are Elizabeth 
Traugott and Olga Fischer, who have both subscribed to an approach which is broadly 
constructionist, albeit to different degrees of engagement. The first’s affinity with 
construction grammar initially surfaced in Traugott (2003) and has so far culminated in 
Traugott (2015), a contribution to the edited collection already referred to that 
summarizes parts of a book she co-authored with Graeme Trousdale entitled 
“Constructionalization and constructional changes”. This “draw[s] opportunistically on 
a number of insights which have been proposed in […] constructional accounts of 
language […], without adhering to one particular type of construction grammar” 
(Traugott & Trousdale 2013: 3) so as to offer an “overarching view of constructional 
change” and to give an account of “the special kind of change of the sort [they] call 
constructionalization” (2013: 39). Olga Fischer, for her part, has repeatedly, though not 
very prominently, acknowledged that the approach to morphosyntactic change she 
proposes is congruent with construction grammar, both in the book in which the 
approach was first presented (cf. Fischer 2007: 78, 95, 142) and in subsequent work (cf. 
Fischer 2008: 341; 2010: 189). 
Both Traugott and Fischer unequivocally underwrite what has come to be known as 
“the usage-based approach to language” after Ronald Langacker’s coinage of the term 
“usage-based model” for a conception of language in which “[s]ubstantial importance 
is given to the actual use of the linguistic system and a speaker’s knowledge of this use” 
(Langacker 1987: 494). In another single-authored summary of the Traugott and 
Trousdale book, Traugott (2014: 4) characterizes its take on language change as “a 
usage-based construction grammar perspective” and the second of the book’s two 
groundlaying chapters is entitled “A usage-based approach to sign change”. Similarly, 
as summarized by herself in its introduction, the first, theoretical, part of Fischer’s book 
concludes by “[s]tressing the binary nature of the linguistic sign (the importance of both 
form and function)” and suggesting that “a usage-based, analogical model may prove 
to be the most fertile model for understanding morphosyntactic change” (Fischer 2007: 
4); and the book ends with a chapter entitled “Toward a usage-based theory of 
morphosyntactic change”. 
While for many who espouse a usage-based approach to language change this first 
and foremost entails attention to evolutions in frequency of use (Hilpert 2013 being a 
case in point), both Traugott and Fischer focus more on the knowledge pole in the 
dyadic relationship between knowledge and use that is inherent to this theoretical stance. 
Traugott (2015: 54) mentions that “[c]onstructions are types, parts of a language-user’s 
knowledge system”, which are “gathered into a language-specific structured inventory, 
known as the ‘constructicon’” and “conceptualized as a network”. Language change is 
described in terms of “how a network grows and contracts” (Traugott & Trousdale 2013: 
45). Fischer’s different emphasis is that grammar as knowledge is a determinant of 
                                                 
(cf. Trousdale 2012a; Jing-Schmidt & Peng 2016), which capitalizes only Construction Grammar, and 
“diachronic construction grammar”, without any capitalization (cf. Noël 2007; Trousdale 2012b; 
Traugott & Trousdale 2013; Traugott 2015; Peng 2013; David 2015). In my view, the characterization 
offered in this first paragraph does not warrant the use of capitals and I will therefore continue to use 
small letters only. 
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change and that we therefore “need to look at the process of grammaticalization [or 
morphosyntactic change, DN] from the point of view of the speaker, that is, we should 
consider how the structure that is said to grammaticalize is embedded in the synchronic 
system of grammar that is part of the speaker’s acquired knowledge” (Fischer 2008: 
338). 
It is interesting that both Traugott and Fischer refer in the same breath to the 
individual’s knowledge (“a language user’s knowledge system”/“the speaker’s 
acquired knowledge”) and the grammar of a language (“a language-specific structured 
inventory”/“the synchronic system of grammar”). Traugott explicitly talks about the 
latter in terms of knowledge, more specifically “community knowledge”, and about 
language change, by implication, as changes in community knowledge: 
 
[…], we use networks as a way of talking about individual knowledge (i.e. the 
representation of an idiolect, the reflection of an individual mind), community 
knowledge (i.e. the representation of the structure of English at a given point in 
time), and language change (i.e. how the structure of English varies over time), 
[…]. Crucially, for our perspective, innovations are features of individual 
knowledge, and as such are manifest in the networks of individuals, while 
changes must be shared across individual networks in a population. […] 
Changes in a ‘community’ network develop through cross-population sharing 
of tiny innovative steps that occur in individual instances of speaker-hearer 
interaction largely via a processes [sic] of neoanalysis, including analogization 
[…]. (Traugott & Trousdale 2013: 46) 
 
The suggestion appears to be that community knowledge is shared knowledge and that 
consequently community knowledge comprises, at the very least, a subset of every 
individual’s knowledge. Likewise, when Fischer calls for an approach to 
morphosyntactic change that does “not neglect the overall system of grammar (or more 
precisely, the conventional grammar acquired by each speaker-learner within a 
particular language community)” (Fischer 2008: 339), there is an implication that 
everyone who is considered to speak the same language shares the same, 
“conventional”, constructicon. 
It seems, however, that such an assumption amounts to a failure to make the 
distinction pointed at by Kemmer and Barlow (2000: viii) — in their perceptive 
introduction to Barlow and Kemmer (2000) — between the “internal linguistic system” 
(“structures posited by the analyst as a claim about mental structure and operation”) 
and the “external linguistic system” (“hypothesized structures derived by the analyst 
from observation of linguistic data, with no expectation that such structures are 
cognitively instantiated”). Talking about “the representation of the structure of [a 
language] at a given point in time” in terms of knowledge, as do Traugott and Trousdale, 
or about “the conventional system of grammar” as something that is acquired by the 
language user, as does Fischer, in effect, if not intentionally, cognitively reifies “a kind 
of common denominator of individual grammars”, which Fischer (2007: 6) had stated 
in the introduction to her book to be a concept she did not work with. From what I 
would call a more radically usage-based perspective, however, it cannot be taken for 
granted that all speakers of the same (variety of a) language share any particular 
constructicon and many of the constructions which are shared are unlikely to be equally 
salient or entrenched in each individual’s constructicon (cf. Dąbrowska 2012; Barlow 
2013; Schmid 2015). It is an empirical, but possibly unanswerable, question just how 
much of a hypothesized constructicon that we conveniently refer to as a language is 
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shared by everyone who is considered to be speaking it. Conversely, the constructicons 
individuals work with may have content which is not yet, and may never become, 
massively shared or conventionalized. This comprises what is generally referred to as 
“innovations”, which Traugott and Trousdale stop short of calling “constructions” in 
the block quote above, for a reason I will come to shortly, though somewhat 
paradoxically they do recognize them to be “manifest in the networks of individuals”. 
From these individuals’ perspective, however, we cannot realistically assume that there 
are separate boxes for shared and unshared parts of their constructicons or that parts of 
their networks are tagged as conventional and others as unconventional (barring 
conscious neologistic creations). Consequently, from a radically usage-based 
perspective there can only be individual knowledge and we should not confuse this with 
linguists’ descriptions of a synchronic system which make abstraction from individuals. 
These are descriptions of conventions and, as Schmid (2015: 18) has cogently argued, 
“conventions […] must not simply be regarded as shared pieces of knowledge” but 
instead as collective “implicit agreement on how to solve communicative tasks”; that 
is, they result from “collective social processes” rather than “individual cognitive” ones 
(Schmid 2015: 22). 
To what extent does the blending of internal and external systems do damage to 
Traugott’s and Fischer’s proposals for a usage-based account of change? Of course, the 
mere reference to conventionalization, or to a conventional language system even, is 
unproblematic as long as we are clear about what is meant by the latter. Indeed, for a 
historical linguist “innovations made by individual users do not count as changes; only 
those that are replicated, transmitted to other users, and therefore conventionalized, do 
so” (Traugott 2015: 53). Conventionalization is consequently an integral part of 
Traugott’s (2015: 56) definition of constructionalization, the creation of a new 
construction: “When there have been morphosyntactic and semantic reanalyses that are 
shared across speakers and hearers in a social network, a new micro-construction or 
schema is added to the network, because a new conventional symbolic unit, and hence 
a new type node, has been created.” As a statement about the evolution of the network, 
i.e. the constructicon of a language resulting from conventionalization, this works (at 
least as long as one does not take issue with its reification). In Traugott’s model 
constructionalization is preceded by “pre-constructionalization constructional changes”, 
however, whose description makes use of the concept of “mismatch”, first invoked in 
Traugott (2007), and from a radically usage-based perspective this is a problematical 
concept, given that it amounts to a disparity between internal and external systems. As 
described in Traugott (2015: 55-6), pre-constructionalization constructional changes  
 
typically involve language-users loosely associating an implicature or “invited 
inference” from a construct with the semantics of an existing construction in the 
constructional network, preferring to use parts of the construct in a particular 
distributional niche, or repeating part of a construct as a chunk. As a result of 
repeated associations, groups of language-users come to tacitly agree on a 
conventional relationship between the original form and a newly analyzed 
meaning. This leads to mismatch […] between the morphosyntax of the original 
construction and the new constructs.  
 
This can hardly be interpreted to mean that there is some kind of conflict between what 
speakers do and what they know, and one would expect the mismatch referred to to 
reside in a difference between certain speakers’ individual knowledge and most other 
speakers’ knowledge. This is indeed why Andersen’s (2001: 231) term “neoanalysis” 
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is adopted in favour of reanalysis: “If a language user who has not yet internalized the 
construction in question, interprets the construction in a different way from the speaker, 
‘re’-analysis has not occurred, only ‘different’ analysis; strictly speaking, one cannot 
‘re’-analyze a structure one does not ‘have’” (Traugott and Trousdale 2013: 36). The 
appeal to mismatch in the Traugottian account of constructionalization consequently 
amounts to a muddling up of speaker-internal and speaker-external systems. For the 
individual speaker there is no mismatch. Therefore, when Traugott (2015: 51, 65) 
insists that reanalysis is the primary “mechanism” of change, and that “analogization” 
is a kind of reanalysis, she is really talking about developments in an external system, 
while the reference to language users and speakers imply internal systems. 
Such a “blurring” of “the distinction between speaker level and language level” was 
already remarked upon by Fischer (2007: 117), as a criticism directed at grammaticaliz-
ation theory. She poses the question “is there an actual reanalysis in psycho-
/neurolinguistic terms?” (Fischer 2009: 7), and answers it in the negative, arguing 
instead that “[i]t is only from the point of view of the abstract system of grammar that 
one can speak of reanalysis” but that in terms of language processing “[t]he language 
user replaces one pattern with another one through analogy; in other words, (s)he does 
not actually reanalyse anything” (Fischer 2010: 192, original emphasis). Without 
completely denying any role for pragmatic inferencing (cf. Fischer 2010: 204), Fischer 
proposes an alternative model which she characterizes herself as “replacement induced 
by analogy” (Fischer 2007: 48). 
What is replaced with what? Fischer is less explicit about this than is desirable, but 
from the examples she regularly returns to it is obvious that replacement — a notion 
she borrowed from Deutscher (2000) — can refer both to innovative ways of expressing 
certain meanings and to new meanings for old surface patterns. One of her favourite 
examples of the former kind is the creation of the epistemic modal auxiliary may, i.e. 
epistemic may + infinitive, as a replacement for the biclausal pattern it may be that 
(Fischer 2007: 266; 2008: 367; 2013: 524), “due to a formal analogy with the personal 
construction containing dynamic/deontic modals (the type ‘He can/is able to swim’) 
and due to analogy with Subject-raising structures with verbs like seem” (Fischer 2007: 
267). The other kind of replacement is illustrated with the benchmark example be going 
to (Fischer 2008: 354; 2010: 192), the discussion of which in Fischer (2009: 7) being 
the most explicit explication of how replacement should be understood in this case. It 
may be helpful to quote from it extensively: 
 
The ‘grammaticalization’ of constructions, or the way (diachronically connected) 
forms are stored in our brains could be said to resemble the process of conversion, 
and their storage. When a noun like table is used as a verb, the two items are stored 
in different paradigms or categories, both formally and semantically, and, once 
there, they may drift further apart. There is no question of reanalysis here for the 
speaker-listener; he [sic] is simply making use of the (abstract) grammar system 
of English that allows such an option […]. Since there are many such hybrid items 
in the language, he analogizes, on the basis of an existing pattern, that table 
belongs to this pattern too. […] 
In a similar way, with the construction going-to+infinitive, a present-day 
speaker-listener identifies it in any actual speech situation as either a full lexical 
verb followed by a purposive to-infinitive, or an auxiliary (with to incorporated) 
followed by a bare infinitive, according to the patterns of the full verb and the 
auxiliary paradigms that he has mastered in the course of language acquisition. As 
with conversion, the speaker-listener doesn’t reanalyse, he categorizes holistically, 
6 
 
whereby he may apply the ‘wrong’ rule. How he categorizes in each case depends 
on the present state of his grammar as well as the context, just as he can recognize 
whether table is a noun or a verb from the (syntagmatic) context and the 
paradigmatic inventory of patterns present in his grammar. The context is 
characterized by formal […] as well as semantic-pragmatic information. The very 
first time a historical speaker-listener identified going-to as auxiliary, therefore, 
did not constitute an actual reanalysis of going(full verb)+to-infinitive but a 
category mistake, a mistake that he could make because the going-to form fitted 
both the V-to-V as well as the Aux-V pattern. 
 
The answer to the question of what is replaced with what, therefore, can in this case 
only be: different analyses of a surface pattern.2 The difference with Traugott’s concept 
of neoanalysis, however, is that for Fischer the two analyses can exist side by side in a 
speaker’s internal system, without the speaker connecting them. In other words, unlike 
Traugott, Fischer does not switch between internal and external systems and her model 
of change does not appeal to a mismatch between systems. 
Her repeated reference to “the” conventional synchronic system as a source for 
analogy is infelicitous but should in fact not be understood to imply a reference to an 
external system since in Fischer’s model a conventional synchronic system is only 
relevant to the extent that it is acquired by the individual language user and used to 
produce or interpret utterances (see, e.g., Fischer 2007: 117; 2008: 339; 2009: 6; 2010: 
182). We should conclude no more than that she pays no explicit attention to differences 
between individual internal systems. The propagation of an innovation depends on its 
“acceptability” to other speakers: “It is only when an analogy is fairly obvious and 
straightforward that it may be accepted by many individuals and cause a change rather 
than some individual innovation” (Fischer 2008: 370). In more recent work, however, 
she also recognizes the possibility that “the analogies of one speaker need not 
necessarily be the same as the analogies of another” (Fischer 2013: 528), i.e. 
innovations may pass muster for different reasons with different individuals. 
I wish to conclude that Fischer is more radical in her usage-based approach to 
grammatical change than Traugott. She stresses that “[t]he analogical process […] can 
only be explained from the forms and the meanings that analogous structures have for 
                                                 
2 It should be pointed out that while Fischer attributes the notion of replacement to Deutscher (2000), 
their outlooks are different and Deutscher would in this case not talk of replacement but of “structural 
change”. Deutscher is only concerned with external change and distinguishes between two perspectives 
on it, “structural change” and “functional replacement”: 
 
The first perspective from which one can view diachronic change is local and structural. We can 
follow a certain construction through time, and observe the change in its form or its meaning. For 
example, we can follow the history of the phrase ‘going to’, on the path from the verbal phrase 
meaning ‘walk (in order) to’, to the reduced future marker ‘gonna’. In this case, we follow the 
structural change of the phrase ‘going to’. 
But we can also look at diachronic change from a global functional perspective. We can 
observe that at one point in time, one structure X performs a certain function in the language, 
whereas at a later point, a different structure Y may replace X in that function. For example, 
suppose that at some future stage, the modal verb ‘will’ will fall into disuse, and futurity in English 
will be marked exclusively by ‘going to’ or ‘gonna’. If this change occurs in the future (whether 
or not it does is irrelevant), we will then be able to say that although ‘going to’ did not develop 
from ‘will’, ‘going to’ nevertheless replaced ‘will’ as the future marker. We can call this type of 
change functional replacement. (The term ‘renewal’ is also sometimes used in this context.) 
(Deutscher 2000: 14-15) 
 
One could also distinguish the two perspectives as semasiological and onomasiological, respectively. 
7 
 
speakers within their synchronic system and within their communicative situation” 
(Fischer 2008: 369, emphasis added). The mismatch which is at the centre of Traugott’s 
proposal, however, can hardly operate within an individual’s internal system — 
performance-related slips notwithstanding, speakers’ utterances will not conflict with 
their own grammars — and consequently the recourse to mismatch entails an 
entanglement of internal and external systems, which a usage-based approach should 
really disentangle. 
Traugott has been less successful than Fischer, therefore, in divorcing herself from 
the external vantage point that comes most naturally to everyone reflecting on language 
change, be they folk etymologists or historical linguists. Unavoidably, an external 
outlook predisposes one to constructing and accounting for semasiological paths, while 
a fundamentally internal perspective leads one to question such ostensible 
developmental lines for the simple reason that they do not exist internally. A radically 
usage-based diachronic construction grammarian will consequently be more amenable 
to considering homonymy in favour of polysemy and to looking for onomasiological 
explanations as an alternative to semasiological ones. Complementing the examples in 
Fischer’s work, the second half of this article will flesh this out with an account of how 
the pattern be bound to came to be used with a non-deontic/epistemic necessity meaning 
in addition to a deontic necessity one. 
 
 
2. The development of non-deontic be bound to in a radically usage-based 
perspective 
 
2.1. Be bound to in grammars and studies on modality  
 
It has long been recognized by grammarians that English has two modal be bound to 
constructions, the most common one what is sometimes called an “epistemic” one, 
illustrated in (1), and a less frequent deontic one, illustrated in (2). 
 
(1) “Maybe Manchester United will at some point try to make an approach to Martin 
– could anyone blame them?” says Quinn. “It’s the nature of the business. It might 
not be a question of if they do so much as when they do. The point is, if we are 
approached, as I think we are bound to be, then what should our response be?”  
(WordbanksOnline) 
(2)  No butts about it – the United Nations has decided to ban smoking. The U.N., one 
of the last bastions for smokers in New York, will follow the Big Apple’s tough 
anti-smoking law beginning Monday, officials said yesterday. “Because of the 
agreement with the host country, we are bound to follow the local laws,” said U.N. 
spokeswoman Hua Jiang. (WordbanksOnline) 
 
Quirk et al. (1985: 143) list BE bound to as a “semi-auxiliary”, together with be able to, 
be about to, be apt to, be due to, be going to, be likely to, be meant to, be obliged to, be 
supposed to, be willing to and have to, i.e. as a member of “a set of verb idioms which 
express modal or aspectual meaning and which are introduced by one of the primary 
verbs HAVE and BE”. They point out that it has a “necessity” and an “obligation” 
meaning, “[j]ust as must and should” (Quirk et al. 1985: 237). Biber et al. (1999: 718) 
list bound among a group of “adjectives taking post-predicate to-clauses” under the 
semantic label “ability or willingness”, together with (un)able, anxious, careful, 
determined, keen, obliged and prepared, amongst others, but — strangely, and 
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interestingly, in view of what others I am mentioning in this little survey are saying — 
they do not also list it in their sub-group labelled “degree of certainty”, together with 
apt, certain, due, guaranteed, liable, (un)likely, prone and sure. More important for the 
argumentation presented below, however, is to note that they classify bound as an 
adjective. Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 173) do so as well in the section on “Mood 
and modality” of their chapter on “The verb”, listing bound together with adjectives 
like possible, necessary, likely, probable and supposed, as well as adverbs like perhaps, 
possibly, necessarily, probably, certainly and surely, verbs like insist, permit and 
require, and nouns like possibility, necessity, permission, and “similar derivatives”, as 
“lexical modals” which express “the same kind of meaning as the modal auxiliaries”. 
Elsewhere, in the section on the “Passive voice” of the chapter on “Information 
packaging”, they mention that adjectives like bound “are morphologically related to the 
past participles of verbs but [their] meaning has changed, so that they are no longer 
comparable to verbal passives with the same forms, and their connection with passives 
proper is purely historical” (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 1440). Of relevance again for 
what will follow is that they group bound with sure and certain as adjectives which, 
when combined with an “infinitival” are used “epistemically, often (unlike must) with 
a future situation”. They also point out that “[m]ore rarely, bound is used deontically” 
(Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 207). Carter and McCarthy (2006: 670), finally, to end 
this short survey of recent comprehensive grammars, list patterns, as Quirk et al. (1985) 
do, without specifying lexical categories, mentioning be bound to under the heading of 
“other modal expressions with be” (i.e. in addition to be to and be going to), together 
with be about to, be able to, be certain to, be due to, be likely to/that, be meant to, be 
obliged to, be supposed to and be sure to. They point out that “[b]e bound to means ‘be 
very certain to’, and expresses strong predictions or inevitability” and that it “also less 
frequently has a meaning of ‘be obliged to’” (Carter & McCarthy 2006: 672). 
Beyond grammar books be bound to has also received mention in monographs on 
the English modal auxiliaries. Palmer (1990[1979]: 25) lists be bound to together with 
be able to, have to/have got to and be going to as “semi-modals”. He points out that 
“[i]n most of its occurrences it has an epistemic sense” and that it “can almost be 
paraphrased by ‘It is certain that…’” (1990: 55), while when it is used with future time 
reference, the meaning is sometimes nearer to ‘It is inevitable that…’ (which may not 
be wholly epistemic but partly dynamic)” (1990: 56). Coats (1983: 5) mentions be 
bound to as one of the “quasi-modals” discussed in her study, together with have to, be 
going to and be able to. She emphasizes the rarity of the pattern and draws attention to 
it being more frequent in writing than in speech (1983: 43). She only makes mention of 
the epistemic use. Westney (1995: 149) also found this “periphrastic” to be rare and 
explicitly distinguishes two uses: “epistemic be bound to makes a strong claim that 
seems to rule out the possibility that the proposition may not occur, and is closely 
paraphrasable by be sure/certain to, while the deontic use […] makes an explicit 
statement of a moral requirement” (1995: 150). Collins (2009: 86-7) calls it a “lexico-
modal” and confirms that it is “a very minor item in frequency terms” which “expresses 
strong deontic and epistemic necessity”, the latter being “considerably more common”. 
Not everyone agrees, however, that “epistemic” is an appropriate label for all non-
deontic occurrences. First, recall Palmer’s undecidedness with regard to instances with 
future time reference, whose “meaning is sometimes nearer to ‘It is inevitable that…’”. 
While he unhesitatingly assigns an epistemic meaning to an example similar to (3) and 
(4) (1990: 55), he is not so sure about two examples similar to (5) and (6), “which may 
not be wholly epistemic but partly dynamic” (1990: 56). 
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(3) “He’s bound to be in by now — he’s always early.” (BNC) 
(4) “Let's go back down.” Pet’s voice held a note of panic. “You're not opening that 
door,” said Batista, blocking his way. “They're bound to be in the lab by now... 
and on the stairs. Give me the keys.” (COCA) 
 
(5) But while recommending such long-term plans, I must stress the need for flexibility. 
No two years are alike, and what succeeds this year may fail next: further, your 
early plans will be made without complete knowledge of all the factors, and 
modifications are bound to be necessary. (BNC) 
(6) “It is with a feeling of humbleness that I come to this moment of announcing the 
birth in this country of a new art so important in its implications that it is bound to 
affect all society.” (COCA) 
 
Palmer (1990: 37) distinguishes between two “sub-classes” of “dynamic modality”: 
“subject-oriented modality”, which “is concerned with the ability or volition of the 
subject of the sentence” (1990: 36), and “neutral (or circumstantial) modality”, used “to 
indicate what is possible or necessary in the circumstances” (1990: 37). Obviously, the 
latter should then apply here. The difference with epistemic modality resides in the 
degree of subjectivity. Epistemic modality expresses an opinion of the speaker, while 
for Palmer expressions of inevitability are not purely a matter of opinion. 
Along similar lines, and without the future time reference restriction even, Jan Nuyts 
(pers. com.) has commented that (7) is a case of what he terms “situational dynamic 
modality” because it describes a “necessity/inevitability inherent in the situation 
described in the clause as a whole” (Nuyts 2006: 4), while epistemic modality 
“concerns an indication of the estimation, typically, but not necessarily, by the speaker, 
of the chances that the state of affairs expressed in the clause applies in the world” 
(2006: 6). 
 
(7) Anybody with strong convictions that what he is doing is right is bound to stir up 
controversy. (BNC) 
 
In other words, ‘inevitability’ should not be confused with ‘probability’. 
I do not here wish to definitively decide whether non-deontic be bound to can be 
properly called epistemic, however. My interest lies in the diachronic relationship 
between, on the one hand, the construction illustrated by the present-day examples (2), 
(8) and (9), which can be characterized as expressing deontic necessity in that it is 
concerned with obligation (cf. Palmer 1990: 6), and, on the other, the construction 
illustrated by (1), (10) and (11), which has a non-deontic necessity meaning. 
 
(8) The Home Secretary is not bound to act on the advice of the inspectorate of 
constabulary, but he must take into account a large number of other factors. (BNC) 
(9) She signed a contract with Dad about all this, and she knows if you sign your 
name, then you are bound to keep your word. (COCA) 
 
(10) Mistakes are bound to happen sometimes. (BNC) 
(11) Any real revival of organizing, in his view, is bound to require a jettisoning of 
older models. (COCA) 
 
Specifically with reference to English, but also within a typological framework, 
deontic constructions have been linked to formally congruent non-deontic ones as their 
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sources. Traugott (1989) argues that modal forms that can express both deontic and 
epistemic meanings developed the latter as polysemies resulting from the 
conventionalization of pragmatic inferences, and the “semantic map” of modality 
proposed by van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) contains a “cross-linguistically 
relevant” “diachronic connection” (1998: 79) between “deontic necessity” and 
“participant-external necessity”, the latter being a concept that takes in Palmer’s 
“neutral modality” and Nuyts’s “situational dynamic modality”, with deontic necessity 
diachronically preceding participant-external necessity (and the latter preceding 
epistemic necessity) (1998: 95). 
One may expect non-deontic be bound to to have come about later than deontic be 
bound to, therefore. In the next section we will see whether there is any support to be 
found for such a hypothesis in the (online) Oxford English Dictionary (OED). We will 
also try to glean from the OED whether there was similar grammar to be bound to about 
at various stages in time. 
 
2.2. Be bound to in the OED 
 
2.2.1. Deontic be bound to 
 
The OED makes explicit mention of the deontic construction in the entry for the verb 
bind,3 listing it as its 18th use like this: “18. to be bound: to be under obligation, to have 
it as a duty, moral or legal, to do something.” The first example listed dates from the 
middle of the 14th century (12), as does the, slightly earlier, earliest example found in 
the dictionary’s quotation database (13).4 
 
(12) To þonke and blesse hym we be bounde. (c1360) 
(13) I am not bonden to mak deliuerance. (c1330) 
 
By that time, according to Los (2005: 252), the to-infinitival pattern which is often 
referred to with the Government and Binding term “Exceptional Case-Marking” (ECM) 
“was already established” after “verbs of commanding and permitting”. Deontic be 
bound to consequently was not unique as a form-meaning combination, though, as we 
will see presently, it was not a hugely productive pattern yet. A search for passive ECM 
examples in verbal OED entries whose definitions contain an obligative verb5 produced 
eight patterns that have attestations dating from before or around the time be bound to 
                                                 
3 “bind, v.”. OED Online. June 2016. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/19117 
(accessed July 25, 2016). 
4 Additional quotations for be bound to were collected by searching the quotation database for the 
different “past participle” forms listed at the start of the entry for bind immediately followed by to. 
Example (13) was found s.v. deliverance (“deliverance, n.”. OED Online. June 2016. Oxford 
University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/49473 (accessed August 23, 2016)). 
5 The verbs searched for were bind, compel, constrain, force, oblige, forbid and prohibit, which are 
recursively used in each other’s definitions. 
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started occurring: be tied to (14),6 be needed to (15),7 be charged to (16),8 be sworn to 
(17), 9  be compelled to (18), 10  be forbidden to (19), 11  be holden to (20) 12  and be 
commanded to (21).13 
 
(14) On þe helde laȝe, het ure drihten þat me ne sholde none man bitechen bute he 
were teid to menden chirche. (a1225) 
 ‘With regard to the duty of allegiance, our Lord commands that no one shall put 
himself in my charge, unless he were bound to repair the church.’ 
(15) Þenne is hit inedd aȝein forte climben uppart. (c1230 (?a1200)) 
 ‘From there you are required to climb up again.’ 
(16) […] he was chargede þe soþe to seye. (1303) 
 ‘He was ordered to tell the truth.’ 
                                                 
6 Example (14) is not listed s.v. tie, sense 5b, “To bind, oblige; usually in pass. to be bound or obliged 
(to do something). Now only dial.”, but is included in the Forms section of the entry in a shortened 
version (“tie, v.”. OED Online. June 2016. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/201844 (accessed August 24, 2016)), as well as s.v. mend, where this 
longer version was found (“mend, v.”. OED Online. June 2016. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/116389 (accessed August 24, 2016)). It is also included in the Middle 
English Dictionary s.v. teien, as the first example of sense 2(c) “to constrain (sb.), compel; also, oblige 
(sb. to do sth.)” (“teien (v.)”. Electronic MED. 2001-2014. The Regents of the University of Michigan. 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/m/mec/med-idx?type=id&id=MED44656 (accessed August 24, 2016)). 
7 There are two need, v. entries in the OED. The first kind of need, which is marked as obsolete, has an 
obligative meaning, i.e. it expressed participant-internal necessity. The first sense of the second one is 
given as “To be necessary” and therefore expresses participant-external necessity (“need, v.2”. OED 
Online. June 2016. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/125754 (accessed August 
24, 2016)). (15) is listed in the first entry under sense 3 “To require or constrain (a person) to do 
something” (“† need, v.1”. OED Online. June 2016. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/125753 (accessed August 24, 2016)). 
8 (16) is the first quotation listed s.v. charge, sense 14(a) “To lay a command or injunction upon; to 
command, order, enjoin; to exhort authoritatively; to give charge” (“charge, v.”. OED Online. June 
2016. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/30688 (accessed August 24, 2016)). 
9 (17) is the first quotation with an infinitive listed s.v. swear, sense 10(d) “Orig. pass. To be bound by 
oath” (“swear, v.”. OED Online. June 2016. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/195608 (accessed August 24, 2016)). 
10 This example with for to is the second quotation listed s.v. compel, sense 1(a) “To urge irresistibly, 
to constrain, oblige, force a person to do a thing” ("compel, v.". OED Online. June 2016. Oxford 
University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/37514 (accessed August 24, 2016)). The first 
example, dating from the 1380s as well, uses to instead of for to but it is preceded by a long by-phrase. 
11 This is the second quotation of a passive combined with a (for) to-infinitive s.v. forbid, sense 1 “To 
command (a person or persons) not to do, have, use, or indulge (in something), or not to enter (a place); 
to prohibit”, under b “with personal object (in Old English either dat. or acc.) and an infinitive 
(formerly with for to; rarely without to) as second object” ("forbid, v.". OED Online. June 2016. 
Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/72814 (accessed August 24, 2016)). In the 
much older first example, the “accusative” object of the active is the passive subject:  
(i) Þe appel þet ich loki on is for bode me to eoten. naut to bi halden. (?c1225 (?a1200)) 
 ‘The apple that I am holding is forbidden for me to eat but I can look at it.’ 
12 (20) is listed s.v. hold, sense 10 “To oblige, bind, constrain; in later use, chiefly in pa. pple. holden. 
Obs. or arch.” (“hold, v.”. OED Online. June 2016. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/87689 (accessed August 24, 2016)). The last quotation listed dates 
from the end of the 18th century. 
13 (21) is listed s.v. command, sense 1 “To order, enjoin, bid with authority or influence. Properly said 
of persons, but also fig. of things”, under (c) “with direct object represented by an infinitive (formerly 
with for to; also often, as in Shakespeare, without to: cf. bid them go” ("command, v.". OED Online. 
June 2016. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/36949 (accessed August 24, 
2016)). 
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(17) The erchedeknes that beth sworn To visite holy cherche. (c1325) 
 ‘The archdeacons who are sworn to investigate parishes.’ 
(18) Nether Tyte‥was compellid for to be circumsidid. (1382) 
 ‘Yet not even Titus… was compelled to be circumcised.’ 
(19) Thei..weren forbodyn of the Hooly Gost for to speke the word of God in Asya. 
(1382) 
 ‘They were forbidden by the Holy Spirit to preach the Word in Asia.’ 
(20) Thanne were I holde to quyte thy laboure. (c1385) 
 ‘In that case I would be obliged to recompense your labour.’ 
(21) This child I am comanded for to take. (c1386) 
 ‘I am ordered to take this child.’ 
 
Interestingly, like be bound to, two of the other eight early deontic be Ved to patterns 
contain verbs which cannot be said to be “commanding” verbs in a literal sense, viz. be 
tied to and be holden to. These are semantically connected with each other, as well as 
with the patterns with commanding verbs, through a metaphor that can be represented 
as AN OBLIGATION IS A TIE.14 Note, however, that be tied to has the oldest attestation of 
all and that be bound to is one of the earliest attested patterns. There is consequently no 
ground to assume a metaphorical extension of an originally more literal schematic 
deontic construction. Judging by the OED entries for tie and bind, the “obligation” 
metaphor seems to have surfaced first in the 13th century in patterns with a prepositional 
phrase introduced by to, as in (22)15 and (23).16 
 
(22) Ilch man of his wise noteð his swinhc swilch se he is to iteied. Clerc on his wise. 
Cniht on his wise... And ilches craftes þeau swo he beð to iteied. (c1200) 
 ‘Everyone applies himself to his task in the way that he is bound to. The cleric in 
his way. The knight in his way. And of the tradition of each guild to which they 
are obliged.’ 
(23) Hwase..hit bihat god ase heste to donne ha bint hire þer to. (?c1225 (?a1200)) 
 ‘Whoever promises good as a promise to do something, he assumes an obligation 
to it.’ 
 
Specifically with relation to be bound to, this also means that the obligative meaning of 
bind is not restricted to the passive ECM pattern and that consequently deontic be bound 
to should not be hypothesized to have developed in the pragmatics-based way suggested 
for be going to in the traditional grammaticalization account which survives in 
Traugott’s model of constructionalization. 
Though Los (2005: 237) has noted that, unlike thinking and declaring ECM verbs, 
which are usually passive, the commanding and permitting ones “generally appear in 
the active form”, it is also interesting that in the case of almost all of the verbs in the 
obligative group identified above the dates of the first OED quotations for passive ECM 
patterns are much older than those for the active patterns. This is true for bind and all 
of the other verbs except compel and forbid. In the case of bind the first quotation for 
                                                 
14 The metaphor may be less obvious in the case of be holden to but some sort of tie is suggested by 
sense 2.a. in the OED entry for the verb hold: ‘to keep from getting away; to keep fast, grasp’ (see note 
12 for reference). 
15 (22) is the first quotation s.v. tie under sense 5(a) “To bind, oblige, restrain, constrain to (also from) 
some course of action, etc.” (see note 6 for reference). 
16 (23) is the first quotation s.v. bind under sense 15(a) “To tie (a person, oneself) up in respect to 
action; to oblige by a covenant, oath, promise or vow” (see note 3 for reference). 
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the active ECM pattern (24)17 is around a century younger than the oldest quotations 
for the passive pattern (12-13). Likewise for charge and swear. 
 
(24) I will me bynde to be your man. (c1440 York Myst. xxxii. 217) 
 ‘I will bind myself to be your retainer.’ 
 
In the case of tie and obligative need the OED mentions explicitly that the ECM pattern 
is “usually in pass.” and “chiefly in pass.”, respectively. Given this precedence and 
dominance of the passive ECM pattern, a conclusion could be that for (some or many) 
14th-century speakers of English this pattern may have been more than, or something 
else than, a combination of the ECM and the Passive construction. In other words, there 
may have been a schematic deontic be Ved to construction in their constructicons, 
deontic be bound to being one of several of its possible instantiations. 
In subsequent centuries speakers started using the construction with other verbs, i.e., 
from an external perspective, the construction became more productive. Table 1 lists 
its attested instantiations as per the date of the oldest passive ECM example in the 
relevant OED entries. We can conclude from it that following the 14th century the 
construction expanded considerably until the 18th century, since when fewer new verbs 
were used in the construction than in previous centuries.  
  
 
13C 
be forbidden to be needed to be tied to 
14C 
be bound to 
be charged to 
be commanded to 
be compelled to 
be holden to 
be sworn to 
15C 
be arted to 
be bidden to (‘forbid’) 
be coerced to 
be constrained to 
be distressed to 
be excluded to 
be made to 
be obliged to 
be prohibited to 
be put to 
be required to 
be strained to 
be stressed to 
16C 
be coacted to 
be conjured to 
be countermanded to 
be denied to 
be driven to 
be enchanted to 
be enforced to 
be exhorted to 
be forced to 
be foreclosed to 
be led to 
be perforced to 
be predestined to 
be pressed to 
be reinforced to 
be restrained to 
(‘prohibit’) 
be urged to 
17C 
be adjured to 
be bidden to 
be compulsed to 
be distrained to 
be encharged to 
be necessitated to 
be ordained to 
be ordered to 
be predestinated to 
be reduced to 
be refused to 
be restrained to (‘compel’) 
be violenced to 
                                                 
17 (24) is the only ECM example s.v. bind under sense 15(a) “To tie (a person, oneself) up in respect to 
action; to oblige by a covenant, oath, promise or vow” (see note 3 for reference). Recall that the passive 
ECM pattern is listed separately as sense 18. 
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18C 
be confined to 
be discharged to 
be necessiated to 
be obligated to 
be pre-engaged to 
be preobliged to 
19C 
be disallowed to 
be impelled to 
be recommanded to be told to 
20C 
be objured to be pushed to  
 
Table 1. Deontic be Ved to patterns listed according to the date of their earliest OED 
quotation in the respective verbal entries. 
 
A quick glance at the patterns listed in Table 1 immediately makes clear, however, that 
the construction did not merely expand; it also contracted again, since quite a few of 
the listed patterns are no longer in use today. This can most often be attributed to the 
fact that the verb in the pattern stopped being used to signal obligation. Cases in point 
are coact, compulse, confine, conjure, countermand, distrain, enchant, encharge, 
reinforce, strain, stress and violence. In one case the verb disappeared altogether, viz. 
art, and in another the OED mentions explicitly that the obligative meaning is no longer 
expressed with an ECM pattern, viz. exclude (‘prohibit’). Almost one in five of the 
patterns listed in Table 1 stopped being used sometime before now. That still leaves the 
vast majority of them, however, and speakers who use deontic be bound to will likely 
have several of the others in their repertoire as well, if not all. 
This begs the question of why be bound to turned up as a non-deontic pattern at some 
point, unlike any of the others, with one exception. 
 
2.1.2. Non-deontic be bound to 
 
Somewhat puzzlingly, there is nothing on non-deontic be bound to in the OED entry 
for the verb bind and we need to turn to the second of two adjectival entries for the form 
bound for an indication of when it may have started to appear, specifically to its sense 
7(c) “With inf.: Compelled, obliged; under necessity (esp. logical or moral); fated, 
certain; also in U.S. determined, resolved (sc. to go, etc.)”.18 The descriptors in this 
definition are a semantic mix of deontic (‘compelled’, ‘obliged’, ‘moral necessity’) and 
non-deontic necessity expressions (‘logical necessity’, ‘fated’, ‘certain’), and even 
volitional ones (‘determined’, ‘resolved’). The OED user is left to figure out which of 
the listed quotations illustrates which of the descriptors, but there are only two that can 
be neither deontic nor volitional, given that they do not have human subjects: 
 
(25) The lioness was bound to bring forth only a single cub. (1868 E. A. Freeman Hist. 
Norman Conquest II. App. 587) 
(26) Life is a waiting race, in which the best horse is bound to win. (1883 M. E. 
Braddon Ishmael v) 
 
                                                 
18 “bound, adj.2”. OED Online. June 2016. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/22039 (accessed August 25, 2016). 
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Both examples date from the second half of the 19th century and we could therefore 
hypothesize that the (non-volitional) non-deontic use of the form be bound to came 
about in that period.19 This will be tested against diachronic corpus data below. 
The exception referred to in the previous paragraph turns up in this entry under sense 
7(c) as well, between brackets and in small print: “(In dialects tied is used in the same 
sense, as ‘That horse is tied to win’.)” Given the mixed bag of descriptors in sense 7(c) 
there is a lack of precision here regarding the meaning of the unsourced example, but 
as it seems to be a paraphrase of part of (26) and because of its non-human subject, non-
deontic necessity is the likely meaning. Strangely again there is no mention of this 
meaning in the entry for the verb tie, nor in this case in the entry for the adjective tied, 
while the former entry does mention, under sense 5(b) that deontic be tied to is “Now 
only dial.” The last quotation there is interesting both because of its meta-nature and 
because of its source: 
 
(27) We do not reckon obliged in the sense of forced as part of our vocabulary; instead 
we make use of tied. (1892 M. C. F. Morris Yorks. Folk-talk 259) 
 
The book this is a quotation from, Yorkshire Folk-talk, contains a glossary which lists 
the verb tie as an entry, quoted here as (28), where mention is made of a non-deontic 
necessity meaning as well. 
 
(28) Tie, v. C.[20]  Used in the passive voice only with the signification ‘to be 
obliged,’ ‘to be compelled,’ but without any idea of physical force. Also used 
impersonally with the sense, ‘it must,’ ‘it is sure to be so,’ ‘it is certain to happen.’  
 Ex.—Ah’s tied ti leeak efter t’ meer. [‘I have to look after the horse.’ DN] —He’s 
tied ti loss hissen ; he dizn’t knaw t’ rooad.[‘He’s likely to get lost; he doesn’t 
know the way.’ DN] —It’s tied: i.e. It’s sure to be so.—Q. Is ’t boun ti rain? A. It 
isn’t tied. (Morris 1892: 389) 
 
Though the OED does not date non-deontic be tied to, we can learn from this glossary 
that in some places or districts in Yorkshire at least it was in common use near the end 
of the 19th century. Also note from the examples in this glossary entry that tied does not 
need the infinitival complement, which makes its syntax very similar to that of the 
adjectives certain and sure in their predicative use. 
The glossary also has an entry for bound, pronounced “bun’ approximately”, which 
it classifies as a “participle” and glosses as “compelled, whether morally or physically” 
                                                 
19 The quotation s.v. bound, adj.2, sense 7(c) which is likely to be intended as an illustration of 
volitional bound to is (i). The wider context of the example which I have added between square 
brackets makes a volitional interpretation plausible. 
 
(i) [I always feel, before setting out on a long land journey, something approaching to depression of 
spirits; but on this occasion the entire novelty of the expedition prevented the attack, and my 
pleasurable anticipations were almost unalloyed. It was a voyage undertaken principally in search 
of health for me and] I was bound to be pleased with the arrangements [made for my comfort.] 
(1844 Mrs. Houstoun Texas & Gulf of Mexico I. 2)  
 
It is strange that bound to meaning ‘determined, resolved’ is mentioned in this entry and not in the first 
adjectival bound entry, which I will make reference to below. However, since my focus is on the 
development of participant-external necessity/epistemic be bound to, I will say no more on the 
volitional expression. 
20 “C. after a word signifies that it is in common use in some place or district in the North or East 
Riding.” (Morris 1892: 265) 
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(Morris 1892: 281). This is obviously not specific to Yorkshire English but may have 
been included for the contrast with the entry following (though alphabetically preceding) 
it for an adjective boun, which I am presenting here as (29). 
 
(29) Boun, adj. C. (pr. bun approximately).  Ready, going, or on the point of 
doing anything. O.N. Buinn (made ready). There are few words more common, 
and at the same time more characteristic of the dialect, than this; it is distinct from 
the preceding word, though pronounced the same, only that in this word the 
emphasis is always, by the sense, less than in the preceding one, and thus may be 
distinguished from it. 
 Ex.—Ah doot t’au’d meer’s boun ti dee ; sha diz leeak badly. [‘I’m afraid the old 
horse is going to die; she does look poorly.’ DN] —Sha’s boun ti git wed. [‘She’s 
going to get married.’ DN] 
 
The last example in the entry for tie in (28) should therefore not be glossed as ‘Is it 
likely to rain?’ but as ‘Is it going to rain? – It’s not certain’. 
In the OED this boun turns up as the other adjectival entry for the form bound,21 
where it is specified that “the added d in the modern form may be due in part to its being 
regarded as the past participle of the derived verb BOUN v., and in part to confusion with 
BOUND adj.2 = obliged”. Its first, obsolete, sense is given as “ready, prepared”, and the 
second as “prepared or purposing to go, starting, directing one’s course, destined”, as 
in the expressions homeward bound and outward bound. The third sense is qualified as 
“only dial.” and reads: “With infinitive, = about (to), going (to), in a fair way (to).” It 
is added that it is “to be distinguished from the similar use of BOUND adj.2, though the 
latter construction was perhaps suggested by this”. The “similar use of BOUND adj.2” 
very likely refers sense 7(c) in that entry, already presented above, and specifically the 
part of it which I have qualified as non-deontic necessity, in view of the clarification 
offered in smaller print that “[t]he phrase He is bound to win would, in northern dial., 
mean merely ‘He is going to win’; in literary English it means ‘He must necessarily 
win’, the word here being BOUND adj.2”. 
The OED is therefore implicitly ambiguous about the development of non-deontic 
be bound to. On the one hand, by combining deontic and non-deontic descriptors in a 
single definition of a specific adjective bound, it seems to subscribe to a Traugottian 
view of change through a tacit suggestion that the non-deontic use is a development of 
the deontic one. On the other hand, it also appears to hold with a more Fischerian change 
conception by hinting that what it presents separately in two homomorphous entries 
may in the mind of some speakers in fact not have been kept separate. There is indeed 
very little practical difference between ‘going to win’ and ‘being very likely to win’. 
However, if “predictive” be bound to is restricted to the North, and if this were the sole 
source of non-deontic be bound to, then the latter should have started there and spread 
to the South to become part of “literary English”. Moreover, going by The English 
Dialect Dictionary (Wright 1898-1905), there seems to have been very little 
geographical overlap between the predictive and the non-deontic necessity construction. 
Of the ten quotations listed s.v. boun, sense 4 “With infinitive: about to, going to, on 
the point of”, eight are from Yorkshire, one from Lancashire and one which is located 
in both Lancashire and north Lincolnshire, while none of the quotations s.v. bound, 
sense 3 “Sure, certain”, are from Yorkshire and the only overlap is with north 
                                                 
21 “bound, adj.1”. OED Online. June 2016. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/22038 (accessed August 25, 2016). 
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Lincolnshire, two of the six quotations with infinitival complements being located there. 
The preferred non-deontic construction in the Yorkshire dialect appears to be be tied to, 
since, while listing deontic be bound to, Morris (1892) does not make mention of the 
cognate non-deontic construction. The predictive construction may therefore only have 
been a factor in the adoption of non-deontic be bound to in the case of a limited set of 
speakers. 
In the next section a different hypothesis will be explored with regard to its possible 
analogical sources. 
 
2.2. Be bound to in the CLMET 
 
First, let us test the hypothesis deriving from the quotations for sense 7(c) in the OED 
entry for BOUND adj.2 that non-deontic necessity be bound to only started proliferating 
towards the end of the 19th century. A good place to look for confirmation of this should 
be the Corpus of Late Modern English Texts (CLMET), which spans the period 1710-
1920 with three sub-corpora which each cover 70 years.22 I searched the three sub-
corpora for the form bound, manually sifted all the hits, identifying instances of deontic 
and non-deontic necessity be bound to, counted them and normalized the totals to 
frequency per million words. The results can be found in Table 2. 
 
 deontic non-deontic 
 absolute 
frequency 
frequency/ 
million words 
absolute 
frequency 
frequency/ 
million words 
1710-1780 
(10,385,017 words) 
127 12.23 1 0.10 
1780-1850 
(11,207,191 words) 
250 22.31 1 0.09 
1850-1920 
(12,530,220 words) 
409 32.64 112 8.94 
 
Table 2: Absolute and normalized frequencies of deontic and non-deontic necessity be 
bound to in CLMET3. 
 
With almost 9 non-deontic instances per million words in the third period and only 
around 0.1 in both the first and second we can at least conclude that, while there may 
have occurred innovative instances before then, the non-deontic construction did not 
start spreading until the second half of the 19th century. 
We will try to make this more precise below, but let us first have a look at the two 
examples from the first two periods, (30) and (31) respectively, which display an 
interesting similarity. 
 
(30) If ever that man rises into a good or a noble action, I would be bound to be 
considered as a retailer of scandal, and an ill-natured man, as long as I live, and 
as long as my memory lives; but no more of him I beseech you—[…] 
(CLMET3_1_37, 1760-7, Laurence Stern, Letters of the late Rev. Mr. Laurence 
Sterne, to his most intimate friends.) 
                                                 
22 For a concise description of CLMET version 3.0, see 
https://perswww.kuleuven.be/~u0044428/clmet3_0.htm (last accessed on 5 July 2016). 
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(31) “To my thinking now,” said the Jester, who was frequently wont to act as peace-
maker in the family, “our master did not propose to hurt Fangs, but only to affright 
him. For, if you observed, he rose in his stirrups, as thereby meaning to overcast 
the mark; and so he would have done, but Fangs happening to bound up at the 
very moment, received a scratch, which I will be bound to heal with a penny's 
breadth of tar. (CLMET3_2_122, 1819, Walter Scott, Ivanhoe.) 
 
In (30) a deontic interpretation is precluded by the passive infinitive be considered, 
while in (31) it is made very unlikely by what is depicted: a jester is trying to defuse a 
situation by saying that an injury someone incurred is merely a scratch which he is 
likely to be able to heal very easily. Both examples have in common that be bound to 
is preceded by will, which in (30) became would as a result of the hypothetical condition. 
My suspicion is that both are instances of a blend (cf. De Smet 2013) between the by 
this time highly productive ECM pattern and a construction which the OED lists as 
sense 17(d) s.v. bind (v.): “colloq. I dare, or will be bound: I undertake the 
responsibility of the statement, I feel certain.” The first quotation for it with will dates 
from the late 16th century (32) and the last one is an American one from the middle of 
the 19th century (33). 
 
(32) Ile bee bounde hee shall not loose his labour. (1589 ‘M. Marprelate’ Theses 
Martinianæ) 
(33) You 've been stealing something, I'll be bound. (1852 H. B. Stowe Uncle Tom's 
Cabin) 
 
(30) and (31) are obviously isolated examples. No further instances like them return in 
the third CLMET sub-corpus. I will not go on to argue, therefore, that non-deontic be 
bound to as we know it today is the sole result of such a blend. It is very important to 
note, however, that the word bound formed part of a construction that signalled 
epistemic commitment long before non-deontic be bound to started surfacing. Though 
the OED does not mark this construction as obsolete, it has an archaic ring to it today, 
but (33) suggests that it was still quite common in the middle of the 19th century. We 
will investigate below to what extent it overlapped in time with non-deontic be bound 
to. 
Returning to the timing question first, let’s see if we can date the manifestation of 
the non-deontic construction more accurately. To this end I have grouped and counted 
the instances of be bound to in the third sub-corpus per decade by publication date. The 
results are presented in Table 3. 
 
19 
 
 deontic non-deontic 
 absolute 
frequency 
frequency/ 
million words 
absolute 
frequency 
frequency/ 
million words 
1850-1859 
(1,745,085 words) 
41 23.49 0 0 
1860-1869 
(1,679,731 words) 
75 44.65 2 1.19 
1870-1879 
(1,333,011 words) 
51 38.26 0 0 
1880-1889 
(1,599,266 words) 
85 53.15 8 5 
1890-1899 
(2,824,180 words) 
73 25.85 24 8.5 
1900-1909 
(1,908,155 words) 
60 31.44 44 23.06 
1910-1920 
(1,410,367 words) 
26 18.43 35 24.82 
 
Table 3: Absolute and normalized frequencies of deontic and non-deontic necessity be 
bound to by decade in the third sub-corpus of CLMET3. 
 
It can be gleaned from the figures in the last column of this table that the promulgation 
of non-deontic be bound to only got under way in the last two decades of the 19th 
century and that there was quite a drastic increase in its frequency at the start of the 20th 
century. A comparison of the normalized frequencies of the deontic and non-deontic 
constructions shows that the start of the rise of the latter in the penultimate decade of 
the 19th century coincided with a frequency peak of the former. Subsequently the 
frequency of the deontic construction went down, the non-deontic construction 
becoming the more frequent one in the second decade of the 20th century. We can 
assume that its advantage gradually increased in the course of the 20th century. Recall 
that previous research has reported that be bound to is now predominantly an “epistemic” 
construction. In the data Collins (2009: 87) collected from the one-million-word British 
and Australian components of the late-20th-century International Corpus of English 
(ICE) the epistemic construction is about three times more frequent than the deontic 
one. 
Is there necessarily a relationship between the frequency evolutions of both 
constructions? Did non-deontic be bound to come about as a result of the frequency of 
the deontic construction; that is to say, did an increase in the use of the latter lead 
speakers to use the same form with a different meaning? And did the frequency of the 
deontic construction later drop as a result of the rise in frequency of the non-deontic 
one; that is, did speakers refrain from using be bound to deontically once they had 
started using it in a non-deontic way? If at all, these questions cannot both at the same 
time be answered in the affirmative. One could argue that the more the non-deontic 
construction became conventionalized the less the deontic one came to be used by 
invoking a principle of either polysemy or homonymy avoidance, but an already 
conventionalized deontic construction should by the same token have prevented the 
development of the non-deontic one perhaps. To avoid concluding too much from Table 
3 it is important to keep in mind that frequency data are external data (cf. Schmid 2015), 
which as such can only point at what may have been a relevant linguistic environment 
for what happened at the level of the individual language user, and that frequency 
20 
 
fluctuations first and foremost indicate shifts in social usage patterns, which might be 
better explained with reference to cultural/societal developments than by cognitive 
factors. Myhill (1995), for instance, has linked a decrease in the use of certain modal 
auxiliaries in American English — must, should, may and shall — and an increase in 
the use of others — got to, have to, ought, better, can and gonna — to societal changes 
which started in the 19th century: “the ‘old’ modals had usages associated with 
hierarchical social relationships, with people controlling the actions of other people, 
and with absolute judgements based on social decorum, principle, and rules about 
societal expectations of certain types of people”, while “the ‘new’ modals […] are more 
personal, being used to, for example, give advice to an equal, make an emotional 
request, offer help, or criticize one’s interlocutor” (1995: 157). Leech (2003: 237) 
coined the term “democratization” to refer to this evolution and suggests there are 
grounds for thinking that it continued all along the 20th century. With regard to 
epistemic modal expressions, Wierzbicka (2006) has attributed a huge increase, in the 
18th and subsequent centuries, in the range of available epistemic phrases like I think 
and adverbs expressing probability like probably, i.e. in the range of expressions that 
can be used to signal a lack of absolute certainty, to the influence of the philosophers 
of the Enlightenment on modern ways of thinking and writing, and specifically to the 
impact of the publication of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
The frequency evolutions of deontic and non-deontic be bound to may very well be 
independently connected with the developments pointed at by Myhill and Wierzbicka. 
The juxtaposition of the two frequency evolutions in Tables 2 and 3 should therefore 
not be taken to suggest a causal relation between them. If we can free ourselves from a 
myopically semasiological perspective, it does not follow from the fact that the deontic 
construction was around when the non-deontic one started surfacing that the latter came 
into being as a reinterpretation of the former. In what follows I will explore a different 
scenario which takes off from the observation already introduced above that the form 
bound had been part of a construction associated with the concept of ‘certainty’ long 
before non-deontic be bound to started to appear. 
The OED informs us, through the quotation replicated above as (33), that the 
construction in question, I dare/will be bound, was still in use around the middle of the 
19th century. The CLMET data summarized in Table 4 confirm, moreover, that it 
continued to be used after that and that it was still around by the turn of the 20th century, 
i.e. the time of the start of the proliferation of non-deontic be bound to. Two of the later 
examples from the third sub-corpus are (34) and (35). 
 
 absolute 
frequency 
frequency/ 
million words 
1710-1780 
(10,385,017 words) 
3 0.29 
1780-1850 
(11,207,191 words) 
30 2.68 
1850-1920 
(12,530,220 words) 
14 1.12 
 
Table 4: Absolute and normalized frequencies of I dare/will be bound in CLMET3. 
 
(34) There came a moment when, dropping his quasi-official and high political tone, 
he said suddenly with another voice and emphasis: “Well now, my men, I’ll be 
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bound you’re thinking, ‘That’s all pretty enough!’” (CLMET3_3_253, 1894, 
Mary Augusta Ward, Marcella.) 
(35) “Pictures!” the clergyman continued, scrambling about the room. “Giotto—they 
got that at Florence, I'll be bound.” (CLMET3_3_319, 1908, E.M. Forster, A 
room with a view.) 
 
I’ll be bound is paraphrasable by I’m sure or I’m certain, two epistemic phrases 
which were readily available in the 19th century, the first being the more frequent one. 
(36) illustrates both forms.  
 
(36) “You wouldn’t hurt a bird, I’m sure. You’re a brave soldier, sir, and wouldn’t 
harm a woman or a child—no, no, nor a poor bird, I’m certain.” 
(CLMET3_2_176, 1839, Charles Dickens, Barnaby Rudge.) 
 
Like I’m sure and I’m certain, I’ll be bound could not only be used clause-finally, in 
true epistemic phrase fashion, as in (35), but also in a more matrix clause way, not just 
without a subordinator, as in (34), but also with, as in (37). Compare with the similar 
use of I’m sure and I’m certain in (38) and (39). 
 
(37) People of fashion hear so much scandal daily, that one's own particular lye is 
frequently huddled in the crowd, and perhaps totally forgotten; but tell a fine 
lady a scandalous anecdote under a promise of secrecy, and I'll be bound that 
she pops it out within five minutes after. (CLMET3_2_131, 1800, Matthew 
Lewis, The East Indian.) 
(38) “Leonora gave me this box, and it is a keepsake. However, we have now 
quarrelled, and I daresay that she would not mind my parting with it. I'm sure 
that I should not care if she was to give away my keepsake, the smelling-bottle, 
or the ring which I gave her.” (CLMET3_2_117, 1796-1801, Maria Edgeworth, 
The Parent’s Assistant, or Stories for Children.) 
(39) One of the causes, I understand from different quarters, of the unpopularity of 
this new book, is the offence the ladies take at me. On thinking that matter over, 
I am certain that I have said nothing in a spirit to displease any woman I would 
care to please; but still there is a tendency to class women in my books with 
roses and sweetmeats,—they never see themselves dominant. (CLMET3_2_154, 
1820, John Keats, Letters of John Keats to his family and friends.) 
 
It is highly plausible, therefore, not only that the phrase I’ll be bound was considered 
by some to be synonymous with I’m sure and I’m certain, but also that, as a result, the 
form bound was considered to overlap in meaning with sure and certain. Independent 
evidence that there were in fact speakers for whom this was the case is the one-off 
example (40), which dates from the middle of the 19th century. 
 
(40) We scrambled to our legs, and the next minute were down in fo'castle, rousing 
the men. They were sleepy enough, you may be bound; but we almost lugged 
them out of the hammocks. (CLMET3_3_332, 1852, Chambers's Edinburgh 
journal, n°418-462) 
 
As (41) and (42) show, sure and certain were used in the same way. 
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(41) […] and Miss Osborne came. Emmy, you may be sure, was very glad to see 
her, and so be brought nearer to George. (CLMET3_2_174, 1843, William 
Thackeray, Vanity fair.) 
(42) “[…] I cannot imagine that her ladyship would at all disapprove of you. And 
you may be certain when I have the honour of seeing her again, I shall speak 
in the very highest terms of your modesty, economy, and other amiable 
qualification.” (CLMET3_2_134, 1813, Jane Austin, Pride and prejudice.) 
 
Coming to the crux of the argument now, the adjectives sure and certain, with 
which, for some speakers at least, bound will have shared a meaning, were also used in 
a be-Adj-to pattern, as illustrated by (43) and (44), and their use in this pattern is likely 
to have served as a model for non-deontic be bound to. 
 
(43) He confessed, however, that he had seldom continued more than three days in 
the same service, on account of the disputes which were sure to arise in the 
house almost immediately after his admission, and for which he could assign no 
other reason than his being a Greek, and having principles of honour. 
(CLMET3_2_164, 1842, George Borrow, The Bible in Spain.) 
(44) Justice is slow, very slow, in reaching the minions of power; but she is certain 
to prevail at last. (CLMET3_2_126, 1820-2, Henry Hunt, Memoirs of Henry 
Hunt.) 
 
The frequency data for be sure to and be certain to in Table 5 show not only that both 
patterns were around when non-deontic be bound to started to appear, but also that they 
were both on the increase at the time, and that consequently they would have become 
more salient as a potential analogical source for many a speaker of English. In view of 
its frequency, the main model must have been be sure to, with be certain to having only 
a small frequency edge over non-deontic be bound to before the latter’s proliferation. 
From an external perspective, the rise of all three of these patterns is possibly part of a 
wave of similar patterns conventionalizing within the protracted development pointed 
at by Wierzbicka (2006). 
 
 be sure to be certain to 
 absolute 
frequency 
frequency/ 
million words 
absolute 
frequency 
frequency/ 
million words 
1710-1780 
(10,385,017 words) 
147 14.15 9 0.87 
1780-1850 
(11,207,191 words) 
269 24.00 48 4.28 
1850-1920 
(12,530,220 words) 
499 39.82 80 6.38 
 
Table 5: Absolute and normalized frequencies of be sure to and be certain to in 
CLMET3. 
 
Therefore, given that bound (‘certain’) was used in morphosyntactic configurations 
different from be bound to before the latter came to be used as a non-deontic necessity 
construction and given that these morphosyntactic configurations were very similar to 
ones which the semantically equivalent words sure and certain could be entered into, it 
seems reasonable to assume that speakers also started to use bound (‘certain’) in the be-
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Adj-to pattern because that was how sure and certain were used as well. Taking in a 
broader view of likely relevant content of the innovators’ constructicons consequently 
obviates an explanation in terms of the semanticization of pragmatic implicatures of the 
deontic construction. 
What happened in Yorkshire in the meantime? Could a similar explanation be 
offered for why speakers of the Yorkshire dialect started using (be) tied (to) in a non-
deontic/epistemic way? Probably not, because to my knowledge there was no Yorkshire 
equivalent with tied for the epistemic phrase I’ll be bound. Does this pose a problem 
for the proposal laid out above? Only if one insists that speakers of Yorkshire developed 
their dialects in complete isolation from speakers of other dialects. Working from the 
opposite assumption, however, I would like to propose “polysemy copying” in a dialect 
contact situation as a possible explanation (cf. Heine & Kuteva 2003: 555-561, 2005: 
100-103; Gast & van der Auwera 2012: 392-393; Colleman & Noël 2014). Yorkshire 
speakers may have identified the form tied with what for convenience we could call 
“standard English” bound, since both were used for the expression of deontic necessity, 
and in consequence also started using tied for non-deontic necessity/epistemic purposes, 
“copying” the non-deontic necessity/epistemic use of standard bound. The listing of 
deontic bound in Morris’s glossary, referred to above, is in fact proof of Yorkshire 
speakers’ likely awareness of it, but since I have no historical Yorkshire data at my 
disposal beyond what was already presented above, this polysemy copying explanation 
will here need to remain a mere hypothesis. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Diachronic construction grammarians are as much interested in describing the evolution 
of a language (e.g. English) as any other historical linguist. When it comes to 
accounting for this evolution, however, they should take a radically usage-based 
approach and not only distinguish between the constructicon of a language, which 
linguists abstract from the grammatical usage of a community of speakers, and the 
internal constructicons of individual speakers, but also disentangle them in their models 
of constructional change. While ostensibly doing the former, Traugott’s model is 
inadequate in the latter regard in that it accounts for innovation in terms of a mismatch 
between individual speakers’ novel grammatical behaviour and the constructicon of a 
language, which would amount to a mismatch between their internal systems and an 
external system. From the speaker’s angle, however, such a mismatch is impossible, 
since for each individual language user there can only be one system, their own internal 
one, with which their own grammatical usage can hardly be at odds. Fischer’s model, 
on the other hand, is more adequate from a usage-based perspective in that it is based 
on match rather than mismatch. This is a match between novel grammar and old 
grammar. Not completely succeeding in divorcing herself from an external standpoint, 
Fischer, understandably though somewhat misleadingly, terms the latter “conventional” 
but, consistent with her fundamentally internal perspective, she also explicitly refers to 
it as the speakers’ grammar. 
Given that speakers are confined, also in their innovations, by their own 
experientially compiled grammars/constructicons, a realistic usage-based account of 
how grammar changes requires a radically internal approach. Historical linguists 
traditionally trace the development of morphosyntactic configurations and their 
meanings, but while the diachronic semasiological paths of forms are valid explananda 
from an external perspective, they should not be mistaken to be cognitively realistic 
narratives of what happened to specific constructions or of how specific constructions 
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came about in the minds of speakers. What from a synchronic perspective may look to 
be a polysemous form, might for reasons of how the polysemy came about better be 
treated as two (or more) homonyms. To allow for such an account we need to trade in 
a purely semasiological outlook for a broadly onomasiological one that takes in 
constructions which, at certain points in time, did similar things to the ones we are 
investigating (cf. also Croft 2010 and Van de Velde 2011). This is what Fischer has 
advocated and what I have further illustrated with an account of how the form be bound 
to came to be used as a non-deontic necessity/epistemic marker near the end of the 19th 
century after having been used as a deontic necessity marker for five centuries. The 
ensuing paragraph summarizes this account. 
Ever since deontic be bound to manifested itself in the 14th century there has been 
similar grammar around and today we still have be compelled to, be forced to, be 
obliged to and be required to, for instance, as well as be tied to in Northern English 
dialects. Why should only be bound to, and in Northern dialects be tied to, have turned 
up as non-deontic markers at some point? If the explanation for their appearance were 
that hearers started interpreting these forms differently from the way speakers intended 
them (i.e., reanalysis/neoanalysis), a reason will need to be found for why this happened 
to these forms only. Widening one’s angle even more to include other constructions 
that are likely to have been part of the innovators’ constructicons, an altogether different 
scenario readily presents itself, however. Before be bound to started to be used non-
deontically, the form bound was already part of a construction expressing speaker 
certainty which had been in use since the second half of the 16th century: I dare/will be 
bound. This now archaic construction was still around when non-deontic be bound to 
started proliferating. It is not only paraphrasable by I’m sure and I’m certain but also 
occurs in the same syntactic environments. There is other syntactic evidence as well 
that some speakers must have taken bound to be synonymous with sure and certain. 
Given this semantic and syntactic overlap it is hardly surprising that non-deontic be 
bound to started to be used when there was a proliferation in the use of be sure to and 
be certain to, i.e. the latter are likely to have served as an analogical model. In sum, 
from an internal perspective, speakers did not start to use be bound to differently, but 
began to use bound in a way sure and certain were increasingly used. Deontic be bound 
to  non-deontic be bound to represents an external diachronic reality, in that the use 
of the former historically precedes that of the latter, but it does not summarize an 
internal development. 
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